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A B S T R A C T   
We contribute to the experimental literature by examining the causal effect of partner choice opportunities on 
the earnings of different cooperative types. We first elicit cooperative types and then randomly assign subjects to 
a repeated prisoner's dilemma game, with either mutual partner choice or random matching. In each period, the 
individual who fails to attain a partner is excluded from the group. The results from three experiments show that 
mutual partner choice enables cooperators to outperform free riders; cooperators tend to earn more than free 
riders and are less frequently excluded. Our findings are robust with respect to varying group size and whether 
subjects are reminded about their entire partner and earnings history or only their recent history.   
1. Introduction 
Most markets are open to opportunistic behaviour. This allows free 
riders to benefit more than cooperative individuals by exploiting op-
portunities for short-term gain. However, many market interactions 
resemble repeated prisoner's dilemma situations where there is the 
opportunity to choose a partner. When partnerships form through 
mutual consent, people tend to prefer those who keep their end of the 
bargain and shun those who do not. Those who fail to cooperate are left 
without a partner and may need to redeem themselves in future part-
nerships. Those who cooperate reap the benefits of future trade. 
According to Van Vugt, Roberts and Hardy (2007), for cooperative 
sentiment to evolve, there must be a long-term benefit for the co-
operating individual. The competitive altruism hypothesis, established 
by Roberts (1998), explains that partner choice may be an important 
driving force of cooperation. If individuals can choose with whom to 
interact at every step in the prisoner's dilemma game, cooperative in-
dividuals are preferred as partners. Although cooperation may not ne-
cessarily have a direct short-term benefit to the cooperating individuals, 
it may, nevertheless, help in the long-term through the development of 
a good reputation and access to cooperative partnerships. Moreover, 
the size of the society may matter for whether cooperation pays off or 
not (Boyd & Richerson, 1988). Whereas it is easier to keep track of free 
riders in smaller societies, in larger ones, subjects will have a higher 
incentive to invest in developing a good reputation, as the competition 
to be chosen for a partnership is higher in larger societies than in 
smaller societies.1 Finally, in order to know who to attract and who to 
avoid, behaviour must be observable by others. 
The indirect evolutionary approach, pioneered by Güth and 
Yaari (1992), explains how cooperative preferences, or “rules of be-
haviour” as they are also called in this literature, can be evolutionarily 
stable in a repeated prisoner's dilemma situation involving partner 
choice. With partner choice, cooperative preferences are evolutionarily 
stable if subjects endowed with these preferences out-earn subjects with 
free-riding preferences. We engage with this literature by introducing a 
two-step design experiment in which, in the first step, we elicit co-
operative preference types and, in the second step, examine how these 
types perform in terms of earnings in a repeated prisoner's dilemma 
game. 
Subjects’ behaviour in the second step of the experiment may 
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deviate from their elicited cooperative preferences in the first step as 
they adapt to the repeated partner choice environment (e.g. Alger & 
Weibull, 2013, 2019; Alger, Weibull & Lehmann, 2020). When in-
formation is incomplete, free riders have an incentive to mimic co-
operators in order to attract cooperative partners – in finitely repeated 
games with incomplete information, there are equilibria supporting 
cooperation (Kreps & Wilson, 1982). However, it may be psychologi-
cally difficult to implement such strategies, as a free rider in each round 
would be torn between choosing the rational, long-term strategy and 
the temptation to go for the short-term monetary payoff. Indeed, one of 
the reasons why cooperative preferences are often found to be evolu-
tionarily stable is their ability to solve such a commitment problem (e.g.  
Frank, 2011; Samuelson, 2001). 
Scholars from Adam Smith (1759) and Thomas Schelling (1960) to 
Robert Frank (1988) suggest that a commitment to cooperation can end 
up as an unintentional material benefit. In Smith's case, a commitment 
to cooperation arises from self-command – the ability to restrain our 
self-love that has been fostered by the approval and disapproval of 
others. In Frank (1988, 2011), moral sentiments function as internal 
self-control devices in that they make the individual less likely to fall for 
the temptation of going for a short-term monetary gain. This could lead 
individuals to cooperate independently of incentives provided by the 
present situation. Such a commitment to cooperation in a partner 
choice environment may yield higher monetary benefits than simply 
mimicking cooperative intents. Our empirical approach in this paper 
allows us to examine whether subjects elicited to be cooperative in a 
non-strategic environment are , in the repeated game, able to outper-
form subjects elicited to be non-cooperative. 
The literature on partner choice and self-sorting is large (e.g.  
Bernard, Fanning & Yuksel, 2018; for a survey see Kosfeld, 2004, and 
for a meta-study, see Guido, Robbett & Romaniuc, 2019). Previous 
experimental literature has shown that the opportunity to choose one's 
partner increases the overall efficiency (Brekke, Hauge, Lind & Nyborg, 
2011; Hauge, Brekke, Nyborg & Lind, 2019 Page, Putterman & Unel, 
2005). Similarly, subjects who behave cooperatively in a social di-
lemma game tend to earn more (Gächter & Thöni, 2005; Sylwester & 
Roberts, 2010) and end up in partnerships and groups with like-minded 
individuals (Kamei & Putterman, 2017; Page et al., 2005) more often 
than their lower contributing counterparts do. 
Our contribution to the literature on partner choice lies in ex-
amining the causal effect of partner choice on the earnings of different 
cooperative preference types. In the existing literature on partner 
choice, one cannot separate cooperative preferences from a person's 
behaviour in terms of choice of partners, contributions and earnings, 
making the association between types and performance endogenous 
(e.g. Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg & Nowak, 2008; Kurzban & 
Houser, 2005). That is, subjects who differ in their preferences in a non- 
strategic environment can still earn the same amount in a strategic one. 
Our two-step design allows us to study how different elicited types 
perform in an environment with partner choice compared to random 
matching. Our first conjecture is that the effect of partner choice is 
positive for subjects classified in step 1 as cooperators and that it is 
negative for those classified as free riders. Moreover, based on the ex-
isting literature, we expect subjects classified as cooperators to out-
perform those classified as free riders within the partner choice en-
vironment. 
To address this conjecture, we ran three experiments with the fol-
lowing two-step design. In step 1, we classified subjects as either co-
operators or free riders using the strategy method in a one-shot, se-
quential, continuous prisoner's dilemma game (Fischbacher, Gächter & 
Fehr, 2001; Kurzban & Houser, 2005; Selten, 1967). In step 2, the 
subjects were either randomly assigned to a fixed group resembling a 
society in which there was an opportunity for partner choice in each 
period or to a fixed group where there is random matching in each 
period. In both the partner choice and the random matching treatments, 
the subjects played a 20-period, repeated, simultaneous prisoner's 
dilemma game with another subject from their group. Our two-step 
procedure allowed us to separate cooperative types from their observed 
behaviour in two different matching environments (the benefits of a 
similar two-step design are discussed by Gächter, Kölle & Quercia, 
2017). 
In the repeated prisoner's dilemma game of step 2, subjects inter-
acted within fixed groups consisting of an odd number of subjects, 
meaning that one subject was, by design, excluded in every period and 
only pairs of two subjects could continue playing the prisoner's di-
lemma game. In the literature, partner matching has been implemented 
in various ways, ranging from ranking, voting, bidding and unilateral 
choice to mutual choice of partners (e.g. Ahn, Isaac & Salmon, 2009;  
Bohnet & Kübler, 2005; Kamei & Putterman, 2017; Page et al., 2005;  
Riedl & Ule, 2002; Strømland, Tjøtta & Torsvik, 2018).2 Building on  
Strømland et al. (2018), we based partner choice on mutual consent. 
Whereas ranking and bidding entails that one can state a preference for 
a partner, our approach aimed to resemble market settings where 
people choose partners directly through mutual consent and not 
through ranking or bidding systems. We consider that this is a more 
realistic description of real market interactions where a relationship 
between two individuals is established through mutual consent. 
Moreover, we used an asymmetric supply and demand for partners, 
as one subject was left without a partner in each period of both treat-
ments. By linking partner choice to exclusion, we engage with the lit-
erature on the termination of partnerships and exclusion 
(Gaudeul, Crosetto & Riener, 2015; Huck, Lünser & Tyran, 2012; Wilson 
& Wu, 2017).3 Honhon et al. (2020) show that the option to dissolve 
relationships acts as a sorting device, allowing those in cooperative 
relationships to maintain relationships, while defectors see their re-
lationships terminated more frequently. By keeping the number of 
subjects without a partner constant in both the partner choice and 
random matching treatment, we cleanly test whether partner choice 
increases the probability of being without a partner for cooperators and 
free riders. While it may be difficult to disentangle whether subjects 
cooperate because they want to obtain a better partner or to avoid 
being excluded, in real-life market interactions these two are distinct, 
yet not mutually exclusive pathways that may facilitate cooperation. 
Is partner choice more or less effective in promoting cooperation 
when groups become larger? Individuals in larger societies face more 
competition, which may create incentives for cooperation as a way to 
maintain a partnership and to better their reputation (Barclay, 2013;  
Roberts, 1998; Van Vugt et al., 2007; Wu, Balliet, Peperkoorn, Romano 
& Van Lange, 2020).4 To explore whether the effect of partner choice 
2 Some studies allow subjects to move freely between groups based on the 
information about average group contributions (Brekke, Hauge, Lind & 
Nyborg., 2011; Ehrhart & Keser, 1999; Hauge et al., 2019). Another strand 
within this literature implements matching based on price auctions for the right 
to choose a partner (Coricelli, Fehr, & Fellner, 2004; Rigdon, McCabe, & Smith, 
2007). Cooperation increases even when subjects are paired by experimenters 
based on the cooperative strategies they exhibit in repeated games 
(Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007). Finally, some study the effect of opting in and 
out of games when the outside option is higher than the cost of potentially 
being exploited by staying put (Hauk & Nagel, 2001). 
3 For a discussion about costly punishment and social exclusion, see  
Barclay and Raihani (2016); Bayer (2016); Cinyabuguma, Page and 
Putterman (2005); Egas and Riedl (2008); Fehr and Gächter (2000);  
Feinberg, Willer, and Schultz (2014); Guala, (2012); Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and 
Rockenbach (2006); Leibbrandt, Ramalingam and Walker (2015);  
Masclet, Noussair, Villeval, and Tucker (2003); Nosenzo and Sefton (2014);  
Rigaud Maier, Martinsson, and Staffiero (2010); and Walker, (2004). 
4 Generally, the effects of group size on cooperation are mixed; large groups 
have been found to increase (e.g. Barclay, 2013; Carpenter, 2007), have no 
effect (e.g. Zelmer, 2003) and decrease (e.g. dos Santos and Wedekind, 2015;  
Van Lange et al., 2013) cooperation. This mixed evidence on group size and 
cooperation may also be driven by the payoff structure in a specific interaction 
(Bonacich, Shure, Kahan, & Meeker, 1976; Nosenzo, Quercia & Sefton, 2015). 
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varies between different competitive environments, we varied whether 
subjects interacted in fixed groups of five or nine. Assuming that larger 
groups may involve a lower chance for a person to be chosen as a 
partner, our second conjecture is that the effect of partner choice is 
higher in the groups of nine than in the groups of five. 
We also compare the effect of partner choice in an environment in 
which subjects are reminded only about their current partner's id tag 
and earnings (e.g. Ahn, Isaac & Salmon, 2008; Charness & Yang, 2014) 
to an environment in which subjects get the entire history of earnings 
and their previous partners’ id tags (e.g. Coricelli, Fehr & Fellner, 2004;  
Page et al., 2005). The evidence for competitive altruism indicates that 
cooperation increases when contribution behaviours are made public 
(Barclay & Willer, 2007; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). Kamei and 
Putterman (2017) find that cooperation is higher when there is a more 
complete reputational history, such as reminding subjects about po-
tential partners’ fixed id tags and average previous contributions. 
Nevertheless, even when no information is provided about one's po-
tential partners, some subjects succeed in establishing partnerships. 
In our design, we restrict information dissemination to private ex-
perience only within a partnership. Thus, reputational information is 
revealed only to one's previous partners, not to the entire group and to 
potential partners. On the one hand, reminders about one's entire re-
putational history may create an incentive to invest in reputation by 
cooperating more. As Kamei and Putterman (2017) point out, the dif-
ficulty of altering one's reputation may be greatest when subjects carry 
with them their entire average past level of cooperation. On the other 
hand, whereas being reminded only about current behaviour allows one 
to create a new reputation over time, it may also increase the cost of 
searching for a new partner in cases where the current partnership 
terminates. This may make sustaining a current partnership through 
increased contributions more valuable. 
Supporting our first conjecture and the existing literature on partner 
choice, we find that the effect of partner choice is positive for co-
operators and negative for free riders. Comparing performance between 
types when partner choice is allowed, we show that cooperators out-
perform free riders; subjects who are elicited to be cooperators in the 
non-strategic environment earn more and are more likely to attain a 
partner than subjects elicited to be free riders. Regarding our second 
conjecture, we find higher earnings under partner choice than random 
matching only in the larger groups of nine. Although positive, we do not 
find that partner choice leads to statistically significant higher earnings 
in larger groups than in smaller ones. Finally, we do not find support for 
the conjecture that partner choice is more valuable when more re-
putational information is available. Rather, we find that subjects earn 
more when they are reminded of their current earnings and partner's id 
tag. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the 
designs and procedures of our three experiments, Section 3 reports the 
results and Section 4 offers a discussion, while Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Experimental design 
We conducted three experiments with partner choice, varying group 
size and reminder of reputational history. In Group5History, subjects 
interacted in fixed groups of five and were reminded of their entire 
earnings and previous partners’ id tags. In Goup9History and 
Group9Current, subjects interacted in groups of nine. However, in 
Group9Current, subjects were reminded only of their current earnings 
and partners’ id tags, not their entire earnings and partners’ id tags as in 
Group9History. We elaborate more on the features of the respective 
experiments in the subsequent sections. The experimental design in all 
three experiments consisted of two steps, as illustrated in Fig. 1.   
Step 1: We obtained measures of cooperative types using the 
strategy method (Selten, 1967) in a one-shot, continuous prisoner's 
dilemma game. 
Step 2: The participants were randomly assigned to a finitely re-
peated prisoner's dilemma game, which featured two possible 
matching procedures in each period—either partner choice (Choice) 
or random matching (Random). 
Prior to steps 1 and 2, the subjects were informed about the payoff 
function and answered a set of control questions that aimed to ensure 
their understanding of the task (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010;  
Fischbacher et al., 2001). In line with standard procedures (e.g.  
Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010), subjects were not allowed to proceed to 
step 2 until they had correctly answered all control questions. If they 
answered incorrectly, they were provided with the correct answers on 
the computer screen. The subjects were first informed about step 1, 
after which they made choices in relation to this step. We informed 
them that there would be a step 2 but did not provide further details 
until they had made their decisions in relation to step 1. During step 2, 
we did not inform the participants about the input or output of the 
strategy method. Thus, this design reduced strategic spill-over between 
the two steps and allowed for an exogenous treatment effect of the 
different types. In both steps, we used the following earnings function: 
= + +x x x10 0.7( ),i i i j (1) 
where xi and xj denote the subjects’ own and their partner's contribution 
choices. The payoff in step 2 is conditional on having a partner, 
otherwise it is zero.5 Hence, the outside option of not being in a part-
nership is zero. 
2.1. Step 1: elicitation and classification of initial cooperative types 
We used step 1 of the experiments to obtain the measures of co-
operative preferences that are independent of the Choice and Random 
treatment. For the type elicitation procedure, we employed the strategy 
method (Fischbacher, Gächter & Quercia, 2012; Selten, 1967) and fol-
lowed the seminal design of Fischbacher et al. (2001). This procedure 
consists of, first, an unconditional contribution choice and, thereafter, 
conditional contribution choices (See Thöni and Volk (2018) for studies 
using similar classification procedures). The subjects were informed 
that one of these two decisions would randomly be drawn to determine 
their actual payoff and that their partner would also be randomly 
drawn. 
For the conditional contribution choice, the subjects filled out a 
conditional contribution table for each possible contribution choice made 
by their partner. Our classification procedure followed that of  
Kurzban and Houser (2005), who estimated their subjects’ linear con-
tribution profiles (LCPs) before classifying them into types.6 We denote 
the 11 conditional contribution entries by yik, k = 0,1,2…10, and the 
subject i's OLS estimated contribution profile is given by: 
yik = αi + βiyk + uik for k = 0, 1, 2, …10, where uik is the error term. 
We classified three types. Subjects were classified as free riders if their 
predicted contributions were below 25 percent of the endowment, that is, 
ŷ ik < 2.5 for k = 0, 1, …, 10 where ŷ ik is estimated contribution profile. 
Subjects were classified as cooperators consisting of unconditional co-
operators who contribute most of the time and reciprocators who tend to 
match their partner's choices. Unconditional cooperators had LCPs that 
were always above 75% of the endowment, that is, if and only if, his or 
her predicted contributions were ŷ ik ≥ 7.5 for k = 0, 1, …, 10. Re-
ciprocators were those whose LCPs were no further away from the 45- 
degree line than 25% of the endowment, that is, a subject i was classified 
as a reciprocator if and only if his or her predicted contributions were 
−2.5 + k ≤ ŷ ik ≤ 2.5 + k for k = 0, 1,…,10. The remaining subjects 
5 A translated copy of the instructions is provided in the Online Appendix 2. 
6 Similar classification methods are used by, for example, Burlando & 
Guala, 2005; Fichbacher & Gächter, 2010; and Fischbacher et al., 2001. 
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were classified as others.7 In the Online Appendix, we also offer dis-
tribution of types and regression analyses using a 0% and 50% band-
width. Table 1 displays the distribution of the elicited types from step 1, 
in both the Choice and Random treatments, for the three experiments. 
2.2. Step 2: the repeated prisoner's dilemma game 
Experiment Group5History: Groups of five subjects with a reminder 
of entire personal history 
In step 2, we used within-session randomisation, whereby the par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to the Choice or the Random treat-
ment. In both treatments, each participant in Group5History was placed 
in a fixed group of five subjects and informed that the group would 
remain fixed throughout the experiment. We used odd numbers of 
subjects in the fixed groups so that in each period, an individual who 
had not attained a partner would be excluded from the group for that 
period. Table A8 in the Appendix provides details concerning the 
number of participants, groups and sessions in the experiments. 
In the Random treatment, the participants were informed that the 
group would be fixed throughout the experiment. They were assigned a 
numbered identity tag and were informed that this and other subjects’ 
identity tags would be fixed. Although subjects were in groups of five, 
only pairs of two subjects within a group played the prisoner's dilemma 
game. In each period of the game, individuals received an endowment of 
10 units and had to decide how much to contribute according to the 
payoff function [1]. The default contribution was set to zero so that 
subjects had to make an active choice about whether to contribute or not. 
Because contributions in the production stage were simultaneous, we set 
the decision-making time in both the Choice treatment and the Random 
treatment to 10 s to avoid subjects causing delays. In both treatments, the 
default contribution was set to zero if someone exceeded this time limit. 
The participants were informed that the person with whom they would 
be partnered in each period is determined by random assignment. 
As there was always one extra participant in the group, one person 
was always randomly excluded from the production stage of a parti-
cular period. In case of exclusion, the payoff was zero for that period. 
Prior to each production stage, the participants who were not excluded 
were reminded of their partners’ identity tags. After each production 
stage, a screen showed the participant's earnings and his or her partner's 
identity tag. In Group5History, the screen also reminded the subjects of 
all their preceding earnings and partners’ identity tags. In the instruc-
tions, we referred to the other players as a “person” not a “partner”. 
The Choice treatment was identical to the Random treatment, except 
for the procedures given for partner assignment. Prior to each production 
stage, instead of random assignment, the participants were able to choose 
their preferred partner in the fixed group of subjects for that period. For the 
10-second duration of the partner choice stage, the participants could freely 
enter a number on the computer screen. The default was set to their own 
identity tag. Notably, subjects could not use their phones, a pen or paper to 
keep track of their previous earnings or partners in any of the experiments. 
The matching procedure in the Choice treatment was conducted in the 
following manner. Two participants were matched if there was mutual 
consent (both participants had entered each other's ID tags). The subject 
that failed to find a partner was excluded after reading the following 
message: “You will not participate in this production period. In this period, 
you earn 0 points”. The subjects who managed to match mutually with a 
partner received the message: “You are person X. The person you chose 
also chose you. You are producing with person Y in this period”. 
If more than one subject failed to find a partner, then one was drawn 
to be excluded, while the others were randomly assigned an available 
partner. Those who did not match mutually with a partner received one 
of two possible messages. Either: “You are person X. The person you 
chose did not choose you. You will not participate in this production 
period. In this period, you earn 0 points” or “You are person X. The 
person you chose did not choose you. You are randomly paired with 
person Y, with whom you can produce in this period”. 
The Group5History experiment was conducted in November 2015. The 
experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
The participants were undergraduate students enroled at the University of 
Bergen, whom we recruited by email.8 Each participant earned 100 NOK for 
showing up. On average, the sessions lasted 30 min and the participants 
earned 202 NOK (25.30 USD). This corresponds to hourly pay of 404 NOK 
Fig. 1. A two-step experimental design.  
Table 1 
Distribution of Types (%) between Treatments by Experiment.14.         
Types Group5History Group9History Group9Current  
Choice Random Choice Random Choice Random  
Cooperator 66.0 53.0 62.8 65.5 67.4 63.2 
- Unconditional 
cooperator 
11.0 12.0 11.7 7.6 9.7 7.6 
- Reciprocator 55.0 41.0 51.1 57.9 57.6 55.6 
Free rider 6.0 10.0 6.7 7.6 4.9 11.8 
Other 28.0 37.0 30.6 26.9 27.8 25.0 
Total number of 
subjects 
100 100 180 171 144 144 
7 The estimated linear contribution profiles allowed for predicted contribu-
tions outside the feasible interval [0,10]. However, only 6.09% (134/2200) of 
the predicted contributions in Group5History, 6.00% (232/3861) in 
Group9History and 6.47% (205/3168) in Group9Current lie outside this range. 
8 We used the recruitment platform Expmotor to send out invitations, which 
was provided by Erik Ø. Sørensen from The Norwegian School of Economics. 
14 Table 4.2 in the Online Appendix shows the distribution of types by 
bandwidth and experiment, without distinguishing between treatments. 
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(48.6 USD) and is well above the average hourly pay for an undergraduate 
student in Norway.  
Experiments Group9History and Group9Current: Groups of nine 
subjects, varying with respect to personal history reminder  
The Group9History experiment was identical to the Group5History 
experiment, except that the number of subjects in the fixed group was 
increased from five to nine subjects. In this manner, we examined the 
effects of partner choice in larger groups in comparison to smaller 
groups, while maintaining a constant feedback channel. The subjects in 
the Random treatment were expected to receive the same partner every 
fifth period in the smaller groups and every ninth period in the larger 
groups of the follow-up experiment, making the matching environment 
of the follow-up experiment more challenging, and potentially more 
competitive.9 
Finally, the Group9Current experiment corresponded to the 
Group9History experiment with respect to group size, except that 
subjects in Group9Current were reminded only of their personal in-
formation from the current period and not of their entire personal 
history as in the Group9History experiment. In the Group9History ex-
periment, each subject's screen reminded them of the entire history of 
his or her contributions and payoffs, as well as of their previous part-
ners’ identity tags. Only reminding subjects of their current contribu-
tion, payoff and partner's identity tag could increase the search cost and 
make it more difficult to keep track of potential partners’ behaviours, 
thereby creating incentives to cooperate. 
The Group9Current experiment was conducted in March 2017 and 
Group9History was conducted in March 2019. In both experiments, we 
used the recruitment platform Hamburg Organizational Online Tool 
(HROOT; Bock, Baetge & Nicklisch, 2014), which was provided by 
DIGSSCORE at the University of Bergen. Each participant earned 100 
NOK for showing up to the experiments. On average, the sessions lasted 
30–45 min. In Group9Current, the participants earned 192 NOK (25 
USD). In Group9History, participants earned 223.8 NOK (25.47 USD) 
on average. Despite varying the platform from which we sent out the 
invitations, the participant pool consisted of undergraduate students 
from the University in Bergen in all three experiments.10 
3. Results 
3.1. The benefits of being a cooperator 
In line with the previous literature on partner choice, we find that 
the ability to choose one's partner increases earnings compared to 
random matching (e.g. Brekke et al., 2011; Hauge et al., 2019;  
Page et al., 2005). The overall estimated effect on earnings varied from 
6.2 percentage points (p = 0.151) in Group5History to 10.20 percen-
tage points (p<0.01) and 19.0 percentage points (p<0.01) in 
Group9History and Group9Current, respectively. For the treatment ef-
fects on overall earnings in each experiment, see the corresponding first 
rows of Table 2 below. 
Our main research question concerned examining the causal effect 
of partner choice on the earnings of different cooperative types. That is, 
whether subjects who were elicited to have a distinct preference for 
cooperation in step 1 earned more in the repeated game of step 2 than 
subjects elicited to have a preference for free riding. We conjectured 
that the effect of partner choice would be positive for cooperators and 
negative for free riders. In line with this conjecture, we find that:  
Result 1: Cooperators earn more in the Choice treatment than in the 
Random treatment. Free riders earn less in the Choice treatment than in the 
Random treatment. Whereas cooperators out-earn free riders under partner 
choice, this pattern is reversed under random matching.  
Table 2 shows that the treatment effect on earnings for cooperators is 
positive in all three experiments, ranging from 11.9 percentage points 
(p<0.05) in Group9History to 20.6 percentage points (p<0.05) and 
29.1 percentage points (p<0.01) in Group5History and Group9-
Current.11 On the other hand, free riders in the Choice treatment de-
crease their earnings in all three experiments compared to the Random 
treatment. In particular, the negative effects range from 72.0 percen-
tage points (p<0.05) in Group5History to 14.4 percentage points (p = 
0.319) in Group9Current. For regression estimates, see Columns 1 and 2 
in Tables A1, A3 and A5 in the Appendices. 
Comparing the earnings of cooperators and free riders within the 
Choice treatment, we show that cooperators outperform free riders. In 
the Random treatment, this result is reversed. For instance, in the 
Choice treatment of Group5History, cooperators’ earnings are 47.9 
percentage points (p<0.10) higher than those of free riders. In the 
Random treatment, cooperators earn 44.6 percentage points (p<0.01) 
less than free riders. Together, this offers support that cooperative 
preferences are evolutionarily stable in the Choice treatment, whereas 
free riding is stable in the Random treatment. 
To test whether subjects of the same type are more likely to interact 
in the Choice treatment than in the Random treatment, we constructed 
an assortative matching measure. It takes the value 1 if subjects meet 
the same types and 0 if they do not. We excluded from the analyses 
subjects who were in groups in which there was no potential partner of 
their own type, as group composition was random. 
We observe positive overall assortative matching in the Choice 
treatment compared to the Random treatment, across the three ex-
periments. In the Group5History experiment, assortativity is 22.0 per-
centage points (p<0.01) higher in the Choice treatment than in the 
Random treatment. In the two experiments with larger groups of nine 
subjects, the assortativity is 11.3 percentage points (p<0.10) and 1.2 
percentage points (p = 0.812) higher when partner choice is possible 
than when matching is random. See Columns 1 and 2 in Tables A2, A4 
and A6 in the Appendix for regression estimates. 
Recall that subjects in the Choice treatment could meet a partner 
through either mutual matching with their chosen partner or by being 
randomly matched with an available subject within their group. The 
overall frequency of mutually matching with one's partner pooled 
across the three experiments increased from 5.4% in period 1 to 71.7% 
in period 20 in the Choice treatment. At the type level, we found that 
9 In the Random treatment, for a fixed group of five subjects, the probability 
of having the same partner from the previous period is 1/5 = 0.20. Over 20 
periods of play, the expected number of partnerships between the two same 
subjects is 4. For a fixed group of nine subjects, the probability of having the 
same partner from the previous period is 1/9 = 0.11. During 20 periods of play, 
the expected number of partnerships between the same two subjects is 2.22, 
suggesting a more difficult matching environment with group sizes of nine 
subjects. 
10 To avoid inviting participants who had previously taken part in the 
Group9Current experiment, we used HROOT to screen and exclude the subjects 
who had signed up and participated in the Group9Current experiment. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to exclude the subjects who participated in the 
Group5History experiment when sending out invitations for the Group9Current 
experiment because we used a different recruitment platform and the partici-
pant emails from Group5History were unavailable. However, given that three 
years had passed between the first and last experiment, we believe that it is 
unlikely that the same subjects participated in the three experiments, as un-
dergraduate programs in Norway last for three years. 
11 In the literature, there is not always a sharp distinction between co-
operators and reciprocators. Sometimes, unconditional cooperators are not 
present in the data, as in Fischbacher et al. (2001). Other times, these subjects 
make up a broader group of cooperative individuals (e.g. Burlando & 
Guala, 2005). For ease of presentation, when discussing our main results, we do 
not distinguish between unconditional cooperators and reciprocators. However, 
in the Online Appendix, we do provide separate estimated effects of partner 
choice on earnings, exclusion and contribution for unconditional cooperators 
and reciprocators. Here we also provide the estimated effects for the different 
bandwidths used to classify the cooperative types. Though results differ in 
magnitude, the treatment effects are in the expected direction. 
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cooperators mutually match more often with their preferred partner 
than free riders, irrespective of the partner's type, as depicted in Fig. 2. 
As a corollary result, Tables 1.7, 2.7 and 3.7 in the Online Appendix 
show that matching with one's preferred partner in the Choice treat-
ment is associated with higher earnings than being matched with a 
subject in one's group who also failed to mutually match with someone. 
3.2. Group size and reminder of personal history 
Assuming that the competition to be chosen as a partner increases in 
larger societies and that signalling one's cooperativeness becomes more 
important, as suggested by Wu et al. (2020) and Barclay (2013), we 
conjectured that the effect of partner choice would be higher in larger 
groups than in smaller ones. The effect of partner choice on earnings 
over the 20 periods is depicted in Fig. 3. Increasing the group size from 
five to nine and keeping the reminder of the reputational history fixed 
increases the treatment effect from 6.2 percentage points in Group5-
History to 10.2 percentage points in Group9History, but the difference 
is not statistically significant (p = 0.444). See Table 4.1 in the Online 
Appendix for regression estimates.  
Result 2: The effect of partner choice on overall earnings increases with 
group size, but the difference in the effect of partner choice between smaller 
and larger groups is not statistically significant.  
In terms of reputational history, we conjectured, based on the existing 
literature, that more complete information in Group9History may make 
investment in a good reputation more valuable as others can keep track 
of one's behaviour more easily. In contrast to this, Table 4.1 in the 
Online Appendix shows that subjects earned 8.8 percentage points 
(p<0.10) more in Group9Current than in Group9History. Compared to  
Kamei and Putterman (2017), we show that being reminded of less 
reputational information when choosing a partner increases earnings 
more than being reminded of more complete information. One ex-
planation focuses on increased search costs; in Group9Current, subjects 
may cooperate more as a way to avoid being left without a partner and 
having to take the risk of choosing a bad partner when they have less 
information to base their choice on – provided they recall less accurate 
information about previous partners (Miller, 1956). In environments in 
which information about past decisions is less clearly provided, partner 
choice may resemble a mechanism similar to Güth and Kliemt's (1998) 
notion of a “technology” for detecting and keeping track of type-related 
cues. We summarise our finding in the following:  
Result 3: Partner choice increases earnings more when subjects are re-
minded only about their current earnings and partners’ ID tag compared to 
being reminded about the entire history. 
Table 2 
Earning Levels and Treatment Effects Overall, by Type and Experiment.       
Group5History Random Choice Treatment effect p-value  
Overall Earnings 56.5 62.6 6.2 0.151 
Cooperators 50.4 71.0 20.6** 0.012 
-Unconditional cooperators 37.9 106.9 68.9*** 0.008 
-Reciprocators 54.0 63.8 9.8 0.387 
Free riders 95.0 23.05 −72.0** 0.011 
Others 54.7 51.4 −3.3 0.818       
Group9History Random Choice Treatment effect p-value  
Overall Earnings 59.5 69.7 10.2*** 0.003 
Cooperators 55.5 67.3 11.9** 0.014 
-Unconditional cooperators 34.7 44.7 10.1 0.529 
-Reciprocators 58.2 72.5 14.3** 0.015 
Free riders 76.0 53.5 −22.5 0.365 
Others 64.7 78.1 13.4 0.108       
Group9Current Random Choice Treatment effect p-value  
Overall Earnings 53.3 72.3 19.0*** 0.000 
Cooperators 46.5 75.5 29.1*** 0.000 
-Unconditional cooperators 48.5 53.8 5.3 0.837 
-Reciprocators 46.2 79.2 33.0*** 0.000 
Free riders 88.8 74.4 −14.4 0.319 
Others 53.7 64.0 10.3 0.332 
Notes: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. Estimates are based on an ordinary 
least squares regression with no controls. Standard errors are clustered at the 
group level. Earnings are normalised so that 0 is the minimum average and 100 
is the maximum average of earnings. On the individual level, earnings could be 
below 0 and above 100.  
Fig. 2. Frequency of mutual matching in the Choice treatment, by type and experiment.  
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4. Discussion 
We conclude our analysis by discussing the role of partner choice 
with respect to group composition, stability of partnerships and ob-
served contributions. 
4.1. Cooperators benefit from partner choice even in a society with no free 
riders 
We have already noted that the estimated overall effect of partner 
choice is positive in all three experiments. Similarly, partner choice 
allows for positive assortative matching, enabling cooperators to match 
with other cooperators and thereby avoid free riders. However, does 
partner choice lead to efficiency gains even when there are no free ri-
ders to avoid in a society? To explore this question, we exploited the 
fact that the subjects were randomly assigned into either the Choice or 
the Random treatment within each session. This allowed us to take 
advantage of the exogenous variation in the group composition in our 
experiments and to test how other types' earnings were affected by 
having free riders in a group, compared to being in a group with no free 
riders. 
We found that random assignment of free riders to a group lowered 
the earnings of all other types across all experiments, as shown in  
Table A7 in the Appendix. However, in line with the assumption that 
partner choice may help subjects better keep track of their partners’ 
cooperative types, we showed that the Choice treatment counteracts the 
negative effects on earnings of having free riders in the group. Notably, 
partner choice also had a positive effect on the earnings of cooperators 
and other types, even when there were no free riders in the group. 
4.2. Cooperators tend to keep their partners 
Because one subject was, by design, left without a partner in each 
period, the exclusion process was an indirect consequence of partner 
choice—subjects who failed to attain a partner risked the possibility of 
being left without a partner and earning 0 units. In general, we found 
that partner choice decreased the estimated probability of being left 
without a partner for cooperators compared to random matching, 
whereas it increased for free riders. This result is in line with the ex-
isting literature on endogenous matching, which shows that low con-
tributors tend to be avoided compared to high contributors (e.g.  
Feinberg, Willer & Schultz, 2014; Page et al., 2005; Ule, 2005). More 
specifically, the difference in treatment effects between cooperators and 
free riders is 14.4 percentage points (p<0.05) and 7.1 percentage 
points (p<0.05) in Group5History and Group9Current, respectively. In 
the Group9History experiment, we found no statistically significant 
difference in the effect of partner choice on the exclusion probability of 
cooperators compared to free riders. Columns 5 and 6 in Tables A1, A3 
and A5 in the Appendix provide the regression estimates.12 
Cooperators were better not only at attaining partners but also at 
keeping their existing partners. Regardless of the partner's type, the 
estimated probability of keeping one's partner was significantly in-
creased in the Choice treatment over the course of 20 periods in com-
parison to the Random treatment for each of the three experiments. 
This result is in line with Strømland et al. (2018) and Brown, Falk and 
Fehr (2004). In addition, at the type level, we found that cooperators in 
the Choice treatment were 40.2 (p<0.01) and 45.9 (p<0.01) percen-
tage points more likely to keep their previous partner in the Group5-
History and Group9History experiment, respectively. In the Choice 
treatment of the Group9Current experiment, cooperators were 55.7 
(p<0.01) more likely to keep their previous partner than in the 
Random treatment. The treatment effect was 26.6 percentage points 
(p<0.05) higher for cooperators than for free riders in the Group9-
Current experiment. See Columns 7 and 8, Tables A1, A3 and A5 in the 
Appendix for regression estimates. 
4.3. Evidence of mimicking? 
As we did not inform subjects in our experiments about individual 
types from step 1, non-cooperators could find it in their interest to 
“mimic” cooperators in step 2. Increased first-period contributions in 
the Choice treatment in comparison to the Random treatment could 
inform us about whether subjects actually are mimicking to signal their 
attractiveness as potential partners. Results show that the free riders did 
not increase their average first-period contributions in the Choice 
treatments of any of the three experiments. See Column 4, in Tables 1.1, 
2.1 and 3.1 in the Online Appendix for regression estimates. 
Over all periods, both free riders and cooperators in the repeated 
Fig. 3. Treatment effect on earnings, over period and by experiment.  
12 For regression estimates considering the effect of partner choice on the 
probability of exclusion for unconditional cooperators and reciprocators sepa-
rately, see Tables 1.6, 2.6 and 3.6 in the Online Appendix. Here we also provide 
the estimated effects for the different bandwidths used to classify the co-
operative types. 
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game contributed more in the Choice treatment than in the Random 
treatment in the Group9History and Group9Current experiments. 
However, we cannot distinguish whether this was due to a change in 
behaviour of free riders or whether it was because of a selection of more 
cooperative free riders into partnerships. Still, seen in light of result 1 
(free riders earn less in the Choice treatment than in the Random), and 
assuming no selection bias, an increase in contribution does not seem to 
help free riders increase their average earnings.13 Fig. 4 offers a more 
thorough inspection of the distribution of contributions in the Choice 
treatment. We pooled data on contributions across the three experi-
ments, and in general, there seems to be little overlap between free 
riders’ and cooperators’ contributions in the step 2 of the experiments. 
This may suggest that subjects with distinct elicited cooperative pre-
ferences have, on average, distinguishable contribution levels in the 
Choice environment, both in the first period and in the repeated game. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Many market situations are open to opportunistic behaviour, where 
individuals have an incentive to cheat each other. In this paper, we 
draw on the observation that an integral part of market interactions is 
the ability to voluntarily choose a partner. We conjectured – based on 
the competitive altruism hypothesis by Roberts (1998) and the indirect 
evolutionary approach literature (e.g. Güth & Kliemt, 1998; Güth & 
Yaari, 1992) – that competition for partners provides individuals en-
dowed with cooperative preferences with the means to outperform free 
riders, as being avoided in subsequent interactions imposes costs upon 
non-cooperating subjects. We additionally conjectured that in larger 
groups resembling larger societies, there would be more competition for 
partners, increasing the effect of partner choice. Finally, we speculated 
whether a more complete set of reputational information would make 
investment in a good reputation more valuable than in situations where 
less information is provided. 
To investigate these conjectures, we conducted three laboratory 
experiments. All experiments consisted of a two-step design, but varied 
in terms of group size and whether subjects were reminded about their 
entire history or just their recent earning and partner history. In all 
three experiments, we found support for the conjecture that cooperators 
benefit from partner choice opportunities, while free riders obtain 
lower earnings. Related to the second conjecture, we found that the 
effect of partner choice on overall earnings increases with group size. 
Still, the difference in the effect of partner choice between smaller and 
larger groups is not statistically significant. We also did not find support 
for the conjecture that partner choice is more efficient when more in-
formation is available about one's partners’ previous actions. 
Our results are important from a methodological point of view; to 
identify whether indeed cooperators earn more than free riders when 
partner choice opportunities exist, as is suggested in the existing ex-
perimental literature, it becomes important to credibly measure how 
different preference types perform across a variety of institutional ar-
rangements. We propose a clean identification of types that we subse-
quently used to analyse subjects’ choices in terms of partners, their 
earnings and their probability to be left without a partner. 
Similarly, from an evolutionary perspective, it is essential to un-
derstand the benefit of cooperative preferences, as this may offer in-
sights to their formation. If we view preference formation as an en-
dogenous process, it becomes key to identify the circumstances under 
which they are evolutionarily stable. Randomly assigning preference 
types to two matching environments allowed us to study how these 
different environments exogenously affected the fitness of cooperative 
and free riding types. Supposing that the elicited cooperative pre-
ferences in the first step of the experiments represent true preferences, 
our results show that in a random matching environment, free riders 
earn more than cooperators, leading to the conclusion that it does not 
necessarily pay to be committed to cooperation. Conversely, being a 
cooperator pays off when there are opportunities for mutual partner 
choice.   
Fig. 4. Contributions (%) in the Choice treatments in the first period and overall, by type. Pooled data across the three experiments. Fig. A1 in the Appendix 
illustrates first period and overall contributions in the Random treatments. 
13 See Tables 1.2, 2.2 and 3.2 in the Online Appendix for the estimated effect of partner choice on contributions for unconditional cooperators and reciprocators 
separately. Here we also provide the estimated effects for the different bandwidths used to classify the cooperative types. 
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Supplementary materials 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.socec.2020.101595. 
Appendix A. Results  
Fig. A1. Contributions (%) in the Random treatments in the first period and overall, by type. Pooled data across experiments.  
Table A1 
Treatment effects on Earnings Contributions and Exclusion, by Type in Group5History.            
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Earnings Earnings Contribution Contribution Exclusion Exclusion Keep Keep  
Choice −71.953⁎⁎ 20.605⁎⁎ 0.127 0.410 0.122⁎⁎⁎ −0.022 0.219 0.402⁎⁎⁎  
(26.819) (7.855) (0.973) (0.502) (0.041) (0.014) (0.135) (0.046) 
Freerider Ref. 44.634⁎⁎⁎ Ref. −3.937⁎⁎⁎ Ref. −0.056⁎⁎ Ref. 0.043   
(12.490)  (0.683)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
Cooperator −44.634⁎⁎⁎ Ref. 3.937⁎⁎⁎ Ref. 0.056⁎⁎ Ref. −0.043 Ref.  
(12.490)  (0.683)  (0.027)  (0.026)  
Other −40.253⁎⁎⁎ 4.381 2.829⁎⁎⁎ −1.108⁎⁎ 0.069⁎⁎ 0.013 −0.037 0.006  
(14.736) (8.181) (0.824) (0.456) (0.031) (0.018) (0.027) (0.022) 
Choice × Freerider Ref. −92.558⁎⁎⁎ Ref. −0.283 Ref. 0.144⁎⁎⁎ Ref. −0.184   
(29.333)  (1.006)  (0.048)  (0.137) 
Choice × Cooperator 92.558⁎⁎⁎ Ref. 0.283 Ref. −0.144⁎⁎⁎ Ref. 0.184 Ref.  
(29.333)  (1.006)  (0.048)  (0.137)  
Choice × Other 68.641⁎⁎ −23.918 −0.044 −0.326 −0.099* 0.044 0.141 −0.043  
(30.103) (19.712) (1.120) (0.641) (0.050) (0.043) (0.111) (0.061) 
Constant 95.000⁎⁎⁎ 50.366⁎⁎⁎ 2.532⁎⁎⁎ 6.469⁎⁎⁎ 0.145⁎⁎⁎ 0.201⁎⁎⁎ 0.239⁎⁎⁎ 0.196⁎⁎⁎  
(12.791) (4.503) (0.755) (0.375) (0.024) (0.007) (0.030) (0.019) 
N 4000 4000 3200 3200 4000 4000 3040 3040 
Reference group F C F C F C F C 
adj. R2 0.005 0.005 0.095 0.095 0.003 0.003 0.151 0.151 
Note: * p < 0.10, ⁎⁎ p < 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01. Coefficients from OLS regressions with no controls. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the group 
level). Reference category in Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7): Free rider. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8): Cooperators. In these regressions, we do not distinguish between 
unconditional cooperators and reciprocators.  
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Table A2 
Treatment effects on Overall Assortativity, Contributions and Earnings in Group5History.          
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Assortativity Assortativity Contribution Contribution Earnings Earnings  
Choice 0.220⁎⁎⁎ 0.133 0.617 0.264 6.175 2.644  
(0.078) (0.084) (0.422) (0.456) (4.219) (4.557) 
Period  −0.006⁎⁎  −0.027  −0.274   
(0.003)  (0.025)  (0.255) 
Choice × Period  0.008*  0.034  0.336   
(0.004)  (0.034)  (0.335) 
Constant 0.445⁎⁎⁎ 0.512⁎⁎⁎ 5.645⁎⁎⁎ 5.933⁎⁎⁎ 56.450⁎⁎⁎ 59.330⁎⁎⁎  
(0.037) (0.048) (0.300) (0.339) (2.997) (3.389) 
N 2666 2666 3200 3200 4000 4000 
adj. R2 0.049 0.051 0.006 0.007 0.000 −0.000 
Note: * p < 0.10, ⁎⁎ p < 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01. Coefficients from OLS regressions with no controls. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the group 
level). Columns (1) and (2) report the effect of partner choice on overall assortativity. Columns (3) and (4) report the effect of partner choice on overall contributions. 
Columns (5) and (6) report the effect of partner choice on overall earnings in the Group5History experiment.  
Table A3 
Treatment effects on Earnings, Contributions and Exclusion, by Type in Group9History.            
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Earnings Earnings Contribution Contribution Exclusion Exclusion Keep Keep  
Choice −22.452 11.873⁎⁎ 2.110* 0.875⁎⁎ 0.055 0.002 0.353⁎⁎⁎ 0.459⁎⁎⁎  
(24.499) (4.622) (1.201) (0.340) (0.055) (0.007) (0.111) (0.053) 
Freerider Ref. 20.512 Ref. −3.855⁎⁎⁎ Ref. −0.001 Ref. 0.024   
(12.412)  (0.905)  (0.024)  (0.021) 
Cooperator −20.512 Ref. 3.855⁎⁎⁎ Ref. 0.001 Ref. −0.024 Ref.  
(12.412)  (0.905)  (0.024)  (0.021)  
Other −11.246 9.266 3.278⁎⁎⁎ −0.578 −0.004 −0.005 −0.024 −0.000  
(12.740) (6.624) (1.016) (0.353) (0.023) (0.013) (0.023) (0.012) 
Choice × Freerider Ref. −34.325 Ref. 1.234 Ref. 0.053 Ref. −0.106   
(26.197)  (1.259)  (0.059)  (0.112) 
Choice × Cooperator 34.325 Ref. −1.234 Ref. −0.053 Ref. 0.106 Ref.  
(26.197)  (1.259)  (0.059)  (0.112)  
Choice × Other 35.865 1.540 −1.106 0.128 −0.071 −0.018 0.142 0.036  
(27.620) (9.794) (1.358) (0.448) (0.061) (0.020) (0.114) (0.051) 
Constant 75.980⁎⁎⁎ 55.468⁎⁎⁎ 2.545⁎⁎⁎ 6.401⁎⁎⁎ 0.112⁎⁎⁎ 0.112⁎⁎⁎ 0.122⁎⁎⁎ 0.098⁎⁎⁎  
(11.852) (3.278) (0.851) (0.270) (0.021) (0.004) (0.023) (0.008) 
N 7020 7020 6240 6240 7020 7020 5928 5928 
Reference group F C F C F C F C 
adj. R2 0.003 0.003 0.076 0.076 0.001 0.001 0.241 0.241 
Note: * p < 0.10, ⁎⁎ p < 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.0. Coefficients from OLS regressions with no controls. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the group 
level). Reference category in Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7): Free rider. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8): Cooperators. In these regressions, we do not distinguish between 
unconditional cooperators and reciprocators.  
Table A4 
Treatment effects on Overall Assortativity, Contributions and Earnings in Group9History.          
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Assortativity Assortativity Contribution Contribution Earnings Earnings  
Choice 0.012 0.045 1.020⁎⁎⁎ 1.029⁎⁎⁎ 10.202⁎⁎⁎ 10.291⁎⁎⁎  
(0.052) (0.050) (0.318) (0.360) (3.184) (3.603) 
Period  0.001  0.010  0.099   
(0.001)  (0.014)  (0.142) 
Choice × Period  −0.003  −0.001  −0.008   
(0.002)  (0.020)  (0.203) 
Constant 0.505⁎⁎⁎ 0.499⁎⁎⁎ 5.952⁎⁎⁎ 5.848⁎⁎⁎ 59.520⁎⁎⁎ 58.480⁎⁎⁎  
(0.033) (0.033) (0.241) (0.274) (2.406) (2.736) 
N 5817 5817 6240 6240 7020 7020 
adj. R2 −0.000 0.000 0.021 0.020 0.001 0.001 
Note: * p < 0.10, ⁎⁎ p < 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01. Coefficients from OLS regressions with no controls. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the group 
level). Columns (1) and (2) report the effect of partner choice on overall assortativity. Columns (3) and (4) report the effect of partner choice on overall contributions. 
Columns (5) and (6) report the effect of partner choice on overall earnings in the Group9History experiment.  
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Table A5 
Treatment effects on Earnings, Contributions and Exclusion, by Type in Group9Current.            
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Earnings Earnings Contribution Contribution Exclusion Exclusion Keep Keep  
Choice −14.392 29.061⁎⁎⁎ 3.689⁎⁎ 1.538⁎⁎⁎ 0.052* −0.019* 0.291⁎⁎ 0.557⁎⁎⁎  
(14.221) (5.972) (1.541) (0.361) (0.026) (0.011) (0.123) (0.044) 
Freerider Ref. 42.301⁎⁎⁎ Ref. −4.847⁎⁎⁎ Ref. −0.042⁎⁎ Ref. 0.000   
(9.341)  (0.634)  (0.017)  (0.016) 
Cooperator −42.301⁎⁎⁎ Ref. 4.847⁎⁎⁎ Ref. 0.042⁎⁎ Ref. −0.000 Ref.  
(9.341)  (0.634)  (0.017)  (0.016)  
Other −35.075⁎⁎⁎ 7.226 4.000⁎⁎⁎ −0.847 0.033⁎⁎ −0.008 −0.002 −0.002  
(9.648) (6.731) (0.700) (0.568) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) 
Choice × Freerider Ref. −43.453⁎⁎⁎ Ref. 2.151 Ref. 0.071⁎⁎ Ref. −0.266⁎⁎   
(15.404)  (1.536)  (0.031)  (0.120) 
Choice × Cooperator 43.453⁎⁎⁎ Ref. −2.151 Ref. −0.071⁎⁎ Ref. 0.266⁎⁎ Ref.  
(15.404)  (1.536)  (0.031)  (0.120)  
Choice × Other 24.677 −18.776 −2.477 −0.326 −0.026 0.045 0.091 −0.175⁎⁎  
(18.183) (13.856) (1.660) (0.681) (0.036) (0.034) (0.123) (0.070) 
Constant 88.774⁎⁎⁎ 46.473⁎⁎⁎ 1.287⁎⁎ 6.134⁎⁎⁎ 0.076⁎⁎⁎ 0.118⁎⁎⁎ 0.097⁎⁎⁎ 0.097⁎⁎⁎  
(8.558) (3.867) (0.491) (0.272) (0.013) (0.006) (0.017) (0.009) 
N 5760 5760 5120 5120 5760 5760 4864 4864 
Reference group F C F C F C F C 
adj. R2 0.010 0.010 0.162 0.162 0.001 0.001 0.290 0.290 
Note: * p < 0.10, ⁎⁎ p < 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.0. Coefficients from OLS regressions with no controls. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the group 
level). Reference category in Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7): Free rider. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8): Cooperators. In these regressions, we do not distinguish between 
unconditional cooperators and reciprocators.  
Table A6 
Treatment effects on Overall Assortativity, Contributions and Earnings in Group9History.          
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Assortativity Assortativity Contribution Contribution Earnings Earnings  
Choice 0.113* 0.067 1.900⁎⁎⁎ 0.566 18.996⁎⁎⁎ 5.663  
(0.065) (0.083) (0.350) (0.424) (3.496) (4.244) 
Period  0.002  −0.096⁎⁎⁎  −0.957⁎⁎⁎   
(0.002)  (0.023)  (0.225) 
Choice × Period  0.004  0.127⁎⁎⁎  1.270⁎⁎⁎   
(0.004)  (0.029)  (0.290) 
Constant 0.511⁎⁎⁎ 0.495⁎⁎⁎ 5.327⁎⁎⁎ 6.332⁎⁎⁎ 53.273⁎⁎⁎ 63.324⁎⁎⁎  
(0.047) (0.052) (0.230) (0.289) (2.297) (2.889) 
N 4798 4798 5120 5120 5760 5760 
adj. R2 0.013 0.015 0.062 0.073 0.005 0.006 
Note: * p < 0.10, ⁎⁎ p < 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.0. Coefficients from OLS regressions with no controls. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the group 
level). Columns (1) and (2) report the effect of partner choice on overall assortativity. Columns (3) and (4) report the effect of partner choice on overall contributions. 
Columns (5) and (6) report the effect of partner choice on overall earnings in the Group9Current experiment.  
Table A7 
The Effect of Free Riders on Earnings of Cooperators and Others, by Experiment.       
(1) (2) (3)  
Earnings Earnings Earnings  
Free riders in group −19.997⁎⁎⁎ −13.019⁎⁎⁎ −15.977⁎⁎⁎  
(5.935) (4.405) (3.972) 
Choice 5.166 10.578⁎⁎ 17.869⁎⁎⁎  
(4.748) (4.120) (2.816) 
Choice × Free riders in group 20.278 6.321 2.730  
(13.156) (6.800) (6.918) 
Constant 59.943⁎⁎⁎ 63.769⁎⁎⁎ 58.838⁎⁎⁎  
(3.456) (3.256) (1.651) 
N 3680 6520 5280 
adj. R2 0.002 0.004 0.010 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the group level). The regressions report 
the estimated effect of having free riders in the group on the earnings of Cooperators and Others. The variable “Free riders in group” takes the 
value 1 if there is a positive share of free riders in the group, and the value 0 if there are no free riders in the group. Column (1): Group5History, 
Column (2): Group9History and Column (3): Group9Current experiment, respectively.  
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